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306 abstract
The estimation of sovereign risk indicators has a key role for the investment deci-
sions. We were witnesses of inaccurate ratings before the last economic crisis, 
which altered significantly the results expected by many investors. Thus, we pro-
pose an improved rating estimation justifying the insertion of new variables, spe-
cifically, the shadow economy as a percentage of the GDP. We find that by taking 
it into account, the credit rating estimation improves. Our estimation assigns a 
higher sovereign risk to the new European Union member states, whereas the old 
European Union member states see their sovereign risk decreased.
Keywords: shadow economy, sovereign risk, credit ratings, European Union, 
member states
1 IntRoDUctIon
Few are those economists or politicians who could have imagined in advance the 
macroeconomic changes that have been taking place since the beginning of the 
last global economic crisis. In the early 2000s it was unthinkable that some Euro-
pean Union (EU) countries would come close to the economic, social and political 
collapse they have recently been experiencing. The public debt of many of them 
increased and their financing became more and more costly at the same time that 
their credit ratings got worse. In such an uncertain economic environment, taking 
investment decisions becomes a particularly complex task. Currently, there are 
still some EU countries that make strenuous efforts to get out of the crisis. 
Some EU countries have also large informal sectors, which suggests that the size 
of the shadow economy may be a relevant factor in explaining the delayed exit 
from the crisis.1 Recent data (Schneider, 2013) show that the shadow economy in 
Europe has increased in absolute value, although as a percentage of the GDP it 
decreased slightly in the past few years.2 
Authors like Roca, Moreno and Sánchez (2001), and Elgin (2012) find that the 
shadow economy is countercyclical. Furthermore, Ferreira (2008) proves that the 
bigger the size of the shadow economy in a country, the higher the tendency to 
experience greater volatility in economic activity cycles. 
Unemployment, which has increased in most countries since 2008-2009, is an-
other relevant factor that is directly related to shadow economy evolution (Dobre 
and Alexandru, 2009).
1 Shadow economy refers to the economic sector that evades administrative control and inclusion in the 
official statistics.  It is also known as the underground economy, black economy, informal economy, etc. 
According to the International Labour Organization, there are around 15 different terms. Its main aim 
is to avoid taxes and social insurance charges.
2 EU-27, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey.
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307Elgin and Uras (2012) associate a larger shadow economy with a bigger public 
debt, a higher interest rate charged on public debt, a greater financial instability 
and, in consequence, a higher probability of sovereign default. In 2008 there were 
just two EU countries whose public debt was close to 100% of GDP: Italy and 
Belgium. In 2012, there were ten with debts close to or above 100% of GDP.3 
Public debt has increased in all EU countries since the beginning of the crisis.
Considering that indicators like public deficit, public debt, and debt interests are 
essential for credit rating, in countries with large shadow economies, a tax rise can 
increase the size of the underground economy and reduce the government surplus 
that the tax rise was supposed to generate. A decrease in government spending 
could reduce the formal production, leading to a decrease in the size of the fiscal 
revenues, limiting again the government surplus generated by the reduction in 
government purchases. Thus, a tax rise or a decrease of government purchasing 
would increase the debt, and according to Elgin and Uras (2012), in the presence 
of a shadow economy, the probability of sovereign debt restructuring as well as 
the sovereign debt interest will tend to increase. Obviously, substantial reductions 
of the shadow economy could lead to a significant increase in tax revenues (Sch-
neider and Enste, 2000), which would help to reduce the state’s public deficit. 
Despite the evident relationship between a country’s performance and its under-
ground economy, to the best of our knowledge, the latter has not been considered 
by the credit rating agencies in their assessments. Credit rating agencies provide 
information, to big companies or governments, regarding the likelihood that a 
country will repay its loans; therefore, they become particularly relevant in times 
of economic uncertainty.4 These ratings should help investors identify their opti-
mal investment decisions. 
We propose to find ways to improve the credit ratings estimation by involving new 
factors. In particular, we will verify whether the shadow economy alters the sov-
ereign risk estimation; the literature suggests that a sizable shadow economy could 
have a negative effect on economic stability and economic recovery. Moreover, 
while a large part of the existing literature adds more and more details on the 
causes of the shadow economy, and quantifies it (Schneider, 1998; 2002; 2007; 
Schneider and Enste, 2000; Schneider and Klinglmair, 2004), there is still a short-
age of studies on its consequences. This paper aims to shed some light on this di-
mension. The discussion on the causes of the shadow economy mainly empha-
sizes the tax burden, culture, as well as the labour market regulation and the qual-
ity of institutions (Ferreira, 2008; Schneider, 2010), suggesting that overregula-
tion and labour costs in the official economy impel the irregular economy. 
3 Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, France, Hungary, Austria, Portugal, UK.
4 A regulation of the credit rating agencies in the EU came into force in 2009 as the agencies play a key role 
in the financial markets and their ratings are taken into consideration by investors, borrowers, institutions and 
governments when they make their financial decisions.
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308 The old EU member states have, in general, high credit ratings and small shadow 
economies as a percentage of the GDP. 5 However, the new member states have 
lower credit ratings and larger shadow economies.6 We find that countries with 
low sovereign risk improve their credit rating when we include in the estimate the 
shadow economy as a percentage of the GDP. On the contrary, countries with 
higher sovereign risk see a negative alteration of their ratings when it is taken into 
account that they have, in general, a relatively large unofficial economy. This im-
proved credit rating estimation should help investors to take more accurate deci-
sions. 
We organize the paper as follows. The next section refers to methodology, section 
3 includes the variables and data used, in section 4 we present the results and the 
last section includes the conclusions. 
2 MetHoDoloGY
The factor analysis that we apply to our data, described in this section, is a tech-
nique that permits reduction of the data dimensions. What we are seeking with it, 
is to find a minimal number of dimensions able to explain maximally the data in-
formation. 
Factor analysis is appropriate when there is a good correlation between the vari-
ables, and they are explained by common factors. The purpose of factor analysis 
is to identify and quantify such factors. 
It consists of the following phases:
–  A matrix calculation able to express the joint variability of all variables: we 
test the degree of correlation through the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of 
sampling adequacy and Bartlett’s test of sphericity.
–  Extraction of an optimal number of factors. We use a principal component 
analysis technique as it permits a joint treatment of the observed variables, 
reducing the number of data, and identifies a group of fictitious variables 
drawn from the combination of the observed. This way we can reduce the 
data and interrelate these data without introducing an initial hypothesis as to 
what each initial factor means. The principal components or factors are ob-
tained after a computing process of characteristic roots and vectors of a sym-
metric matrix and aim to contain the most variance explained while avoiding 
redundant information. The factors have to be uncorrelated with each other 
and have to be expressed as a linear combination of the variables that have 
been observed. The more variance incorporated in each one of the compo-
nents or factors, the greater quantity of information it contains.
5 The old EU member states are Denmark, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, Aus-
tria, France, Belgium, Ireland.
6 The new EU member states are Estonia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Croatia, 
Romania, Hungary, Poland.
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309–  Rotation of the solution in order to facilitate the interpretation. The interpre-
tation of the factor analysis results is based on the correlations of the varia-
bles and on the factors. The factorial loads of a factor with the variables have 
to be between 0 and 1, so variables with loads close to 1 are explained large-
ly by the factor. Then, a variable has to have high factorial load just with one 
factor. Thus, if it is not possible to find a good interpretation of the factors 
with the initial solution, the factors can be rotated and so each variable could 
have a correlation close to 1 with one factor and close to 0 with the others.
–  Estimation of the factors’ scores. Once we have the final factors’ solution, we 
find the score estimation of the subjects in each one of the resulting factors’ 
extraction. The obtained value summarizes the information contained in the 
original variables. 
Thus, we proceed with the factor analysis in order to detect the structure in the 
relationships between variables. In this context, each variable can be expressed 
as a linear combination of indirectly observed factors.
Xij = ai1 F1j + ai2 F2j + ai3 F3j+ . . . + di Uij 
where:
Xij is the normalized value of the variable i  for the country j,
ai1 is the relationship between variable i and Factor 1, 
ai2 is the relationship between variable i and Factor 2,
F1j is the value of Factor 1 for the country j,
F2j is the value of Factor 2 for the country j,
di Uij is a uniqueness that is independent of the previously described factors,
di is the uniqueness of the variable i, and 
Uij is the way that this uniqueness affects the country j.
Next, we carry out a variance analysis which permits testing of the null hypothesis 
about equal means versus the alternative hypothesis that at least one of the groups 
is different from the others regarding its expected value. This contrast is essential 
when the interest is to compare the factor with respect to the dependent variable, 
which in our case is the country type (see results section). ANOVA requires the 
following assumptions to be satisfied: normality of the dependent variable corre-
sponding to each factor probability distribution, the samples should be independ-
ent, and all statistical populations are required to have the same variance. 
ANOVA is based on the data’s total variance decomposition with respect to the 
aggregated mean which under the assumption that the null hypothesis is true, is an 
estimation of the q2 using the whole sample information in two parts:
– Variation within groups.
– Variation between groups. 
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310 3 Data
The credit rating agencies use a large number of variables for their estimations. 
Some of the most relevant are used in our analysis jointly with an additional one, 
the shadow economy, in order to test whether the estimation improves or not. The 
variables finally selected in the analysis are the following:
GDP Per capita measures the standard of living. Even if the shadow economy 
does not represent a relevant share of the official economy, it reduces the GDP per 
capita.
Real Investment (% change): there has been a relevant decrease in investment 
since the beginning of the crisis. We could not find a link in the literature between 
real investments and the shadow economy. 
Unemployment Rate (% of workforce) is a variable that has experienced an in-
crease in the last few years in many countries. Government expenditures on social 
programs also increased requiring additional tax revenues and producing a conse-
quent increase of the public debt.
According to Alexandru, Dobre and Ghinararu (2011) and Dobre and Alexandru 
(2009), there is a direct relationship between the shadow economy and the unem-
ployment.  
General Government Gross Debt (% GDP). This variable also experienced an 
important rise in most countries and its reduction is especially difficult when 
growth is slow. Elgin and Uras (2012) point out that a larger shadow economy is 
related to higher public debt.
Other selected variables are Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) and Primary balance (% 
GDP).
fiscal Revenues (% GDP). They decrease during economic downturns as house-
hold incomes fall. In the presence of a large shadow economy, fiscal revenues 
decrease. 
fiscal expenditures (% GDP). A variable which rises automatically during re-
cessions, as payments of unemployment and welfare benefits increase.  
fiscal Interest expenditures (% GDP). Nowadays, due to the difficult econo-
mic situation many countries have to borrow in order to finance their relevant 
debts. In some cases, the interest expenditures increased substantially. Elgin and 
Uras (2012) suggest that in countries that have a large shadow economy and con-
sequently a significant amount of tax evasion, fiscal policy adjustments could be 
questionable and the probability of debt defaults will grow, so the interest rates 
charged on sovereign debt increase, too.
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311shadow economy (GDP). As mentioned above, a high percentage of shadow 
economy has a direct relationship with the debt size and an inverse relationship 
with the business cycle. 
Data for the first nine variables proceed from Standard and Poor’s’ statistics and 
those for the shadow economy are Schneider’s (2013) estimations using the 
MIMIC approach. The reason for selecting Schneider (2013) as a source is that he 
provides a full set of data corresponding to the countries included in this study. All 
data are from 2012. 
Once variables are described, we review the methods of shadow economy estima-
tion. We briefly discuss direct and indirect methods and pay also some attention to 
the Multiple Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach.
3.1 sHaDoW econoMY Data anD estIMatIon 
In the next lines we take a quick glance at the different methods used in the litera-
ture, and justify the data set we have selected. There are different direct and indi-
rect methods to quantify the unofficial economy; all of them have their limitations. 
MIMIC is another approach, which focuses on the shadow economy’s causes, but 
also on its consequences.7 
Direct methods have high costs and it is necessary to assume certain sub-estima-
tions. They are based on contacts with or observations of persons and/or firms, to 
gather direct information about undeclared income. Partially, they are based on 
the auditing of tax returns and on questionnaire surveys. Using direct surveys ad-
dressed to the economic agents is advantageous because they provide extensive 
information about tax evasion and about the shadow economy as a whole. The 
difficulties come with the selection of appropriate participants and their willing-
ness to collaborate. According to Enste and Schneider (1998) direct methods are, 
in theory, reliable and simple, but in practice, less reliable and expensive.8
Indirect methods sometimes require not very realistic assumptions. The indirect 
methods measure the “traces” left by the underground economy in the official 
statistics. They are also called “indicator” approaches and use mainly macroeco-
nomic data. These methods are used more often than the previous ones. They have 
a monetary or non-monetary character and may include different variables. Mon-
etary methods, for instance, draw from the hypothesis that irregular transactions 
can be carried out using the most liquid form of money, especially cash and bank 
sight deposits. Indirect approaches contain information about the development of 
the shadow economy over time (Schneider and Klingmair, 2004). The size of the 
7 It is based on a dynamic multiple-indicators multiple-causes model, which includes a measurement model 
linking observable indicators to the size of the shadow economy and a structural equation model that links 
causes and consequences. 
8 It is possible that people who evade taxes do not want to respond honestly to surveys even though confi-
dentiality is guaranteed.
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312 shadow economy can be estimated through the discrepancy between national ex-
penditure and income statistics, the discrepancy between the official and the ac-
tual labour force, the transactions approach, the currency demand approach, the 
electricity consumption method.
The multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) approach or model approach is 
based on the statistical theory of latent variables. As Enste and Schneider (1998) 
explain, the underground economy is measured as an unobserved variable using a 
factor analytic approach. It consists, in general, of two parts: the measurement 
model, which associates the unobserved variable with observed indicators, and 
the structural equations model, which establishes the causal relationships among 
the unobserved variables. In order to proceed with the benchmarking and calcu-
late the absolute values of the shadow economy, it is necessary to use other meth-
ods such as the currency demand approach. 
The MIMIC approach has been used in the past 30 years by many authors, such as 
Helberger and Knepel (1988), Pozo (1996), Schneider (2003; 2007; 2013). How-
ever, it was strongly criticized by Breusch (2005), challenging the hypothesis of 
the MIMIC approach and indicating that some empirical results (Giles and Tedds, 
2002; Dell’Anno and Schneider, 2003; Bajada and Schneider, 2005) he had ana-
lysed had no scientific value. 
4 ResUlts
We begin by testing if it is suitable to conduct a factor analysis with the selected 
data used for the sovereign risk estimation.
Measuring the sampling adequacy, we find an acceptable result. 
Table 1
Results of measuring the sampling adequacy
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy 0.534
Bartlett’s test of sphericity
Approx. Chi-square 276.235
df 36
Sig. 0.000
Source: Authors’ findings.
Furthermore, we find that the null hypothesis can be rejected, and the adjustment 
of the variables through factor analysis is suitable. When we repeat the same tests, 
but including the variable shadow economy as a percentage of the GDP, we find 
that the sampling adequacy KMO improves as its value becomes 0.613 and the 
null hypothesis is again rejected. 
Following the extraction of factors, we examine the table of Communalities which 
shows us how much of the variance in each of the original variables is explained 
by the extracted factors.
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313Table 2 
Communalities
Initial extraction
GDP Per Capita ($) 1.000 0.858
Real Investment (% change) 1.000 0.620
Unemployment Rate (% of workforce) 1.000 0.667
General Government Gross Debt (% GDP) 1.000 0.799
Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) 1.000 0.976
Primary Balance (% GDP) 1.000 0.974
Fiscal Revenues (% GDP) 1.000 0.917
Fiscal Expenditures (% GDP) 1.000 0.904
Fiscal Interest Expenditures (% GDP) 1.000 0.915
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Source: Authors’ findings.
The communality is the sum of the squares of factorial loads in each row. Princi-
pal components analysis assumes that the total variance of each of the original 
variables is explained by all components, and therefore, the communality takes 
the initial value of one.  
In the second column we can see the respective communality for each variable after 
the extraction of the factors. The variance of a variable is decomposed in the vari-
ance which is due to the common factors and to the unique factors. We observe that 
variables such as Deficit/Surplus, Primary Balance, Fiscal Revenues, Fiscal Interest 
Expenditure and Fiscal Expenditures explain the variance to a greater degree. 
Table 3 
Communalities, with shadow economy (GDP)
Initial extraction
GDP Per Capita ($) 1.000 0.895
Real Investment (% change) 1.000 0.612
Unemployment Rate (% of workforce) 1.000 0.672
General Government Gross Debt (% GDP) 1.000 0.820
Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) 1.000 0.968
Primary Balance (% GDP) 1.000 0.970
Fiscal Revenues (% GDP) 1.000 0.882
Fiscal Expenditures (% GDP) 1.000 0.852
Fiscal Interest Expenditures (% GDP) 1.000 0.913
Shadow Economy (% GDP) 1.000 0.832
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Source: Authors’ findings.
The previous tables with and without the variable “shadow economy as percentage 
of GDP” show that the communalities for all variables are above 0.50. Thus, we do 
not exclude any of them from the analysis on the basis of low communalities.
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314 To determine how many factors to include, we choose the variance explained by 
each one of the extracted factors. This information is presented in tables 4 and 5. 
The results (without the variable Shadow Economy (% GDP) indicate that after 
selection of the first factor (FAC 1.1), which includes the variables Per Capita 
GDP, Real Investment (change), Unemployment Rate (of workforce), General 
Government Gross Debt (GDP), Deficit/Surplus (GDP), Primary Balance (GDP), 
Fiscal Revenues (GDP), Fiscal Expenditures (GDP), Fiscal Interest Expenditures 
(GDP), explains 40.8% of the total sovereign risk variance.
Table 4 
Total variance explained 
component
Initial eigenvalues extraction sums of squared loadings
total % of 
variance
cumulative 
%
total % of 
variance
cumulative 
% 
1 3.676 40.845  40.845 3.676 40.845 40.845
2 2.691 29.901  70.745 2.691 29.901 70.745
3 1.264 14.046  84.791 1.264 14.046 84.791
4 0.556  6.179  90.970
5 0.472  5.241  96.211
6 0.267  2.967  99.178
7 0.072  0.797  99.975
8 0.002  0.024  99.999
9 0.000  0.001 100.000
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Source: Authors’ findings.
Once we include the shadow economy (% GDP), we obtain an improved sovereign 
risk estimation. The total variance explained by the first factor becomes now 44.4%.
Table 5 
Total variance explained with the variable shadow economy (% GDP)
component
Initial eigenvalues extraction sums of squared loadings
total % of 
variance
cumulative 
%
total % of 
variance
cumulative 
% 
1 4.436 44.364 44.364 4.436 44.364 44.364
2 2.691 26.911 71.274 2.691 26.911 71.274
3 1.291 12.909 84.184 1.291 12.909 84.184
4 0.581  5.813 89.997
5 0.528  5.283 95.280
6 0.300  2.996 98.276
7 0.099  0.993 99.269
8 0.071  0.710 99.978
9 0.002  0.021 99.999
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Source: Authors’ findings.
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315We extract three components and obtain the matrix presented in table 6. 
Table 6 
Component matrix
component
1 2 3
GDP Per Capita ($) 0.859 0.201 -0.282
Real Investment (% change) -0.596 0.394 -0.331
Unemployment Rate (% of workforce) -0.580 -0.569 -0.082
General Government Gross Debt (% GDP) 0.724 -0.455 0.262
Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) -0.314 0.888 0.297
Primary Balance (% GDP) -0.050 0.611 0.773
Fiscal Revenues (% GDP) 0.775 0.534 -0.176
Fiscal Expenditures (% GDP) 0.867 0.296 -0.255
Fiscal Interest Expenditures (% GDP) 0.520 -0.600 0.534
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Source: Authors’ findings.
Table 6 shows the correlation coefficients of the original typified variables with 
the three retained principal components. GDP Per Capita, Fiscal Expenditures, 
Fiscal Revenues and Gross Debt have significant positive relationship with the 
first component. Once the variable Shadow Economy is included (see table 7), we 
can prove its strong negative relationship with the first component or factor. The 
variable GDP Per Capita is positively correlated to the first component in a higher 
degree. The variable Deficit/Surplus has again a significant positive relationship 
with the second component. Finally, Primary Balance has again a high positive 
correlation with the third component. 
Table 7 
Component matrix, with the variable shadow economy (GDP)
component
1 2 3
GDP Per Capita ($) 0.890 0.202 -0.251
Real Investment (% change) -0.561 0.393 -0.378
Unemployment Rate (% of workforce) -0.580 -0.570 -0.106
General Government Gross Debt (% GDP) 0.732 -0.454 0.280
Deficit/Surplus (% GDP) -0.323 0.861 0.275
Primary Balance (% GDP) -0.062 0.666 0.724
Fiscal Revenues (% GDP) 0.762 0.536 -0.120
Fiscal Expenditures (% GDP) 0.853 0.297 -0.189
Fiscal Interest Expenditures (% GDP) 0.484 -0.599 0.566
Shadow Economy (% GDP) -0.898 0.159
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
Source: Authors’ findings.
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316 The next step in the analysis is the variance analysis of the first factor (FAC 1.1) 
and the variable countrytype9 (see table 8a).
The means are different for each group. The critical probability value and the sta-
tistical Fisher-Snedecor value are shown in table 8b. The p-value is less than 0.05 
and the null hypothesis of equal means is rejected, so there are differences in the 
means of each group and therefore sovereign risk is different for each group. The 
result for the new member states is negative which explains their higher risk rating 
and it is positive for the old member states, and this explains their lower risk rating. 
Table 8
One way ANOVA I
a) ReGR factor score 1 for analysis 1  
n Mean std. 
deviation
std. 
error
95% confidence 
interval for mean
Min. Max.
lower 
bound
Upper 
bound
New member 
states 10 -0.7919 0.4745 0.1500 -1.1312 -0.4524 -1.2676 0.2133
Old member 
states 10 0.7919 0.7018 0.2219 0.2898 1.2939 -0.5976 1.8981
Total 20 0.0000 1.0000 0.2236 -0.4680 0.4680 -1.2676 1.8981
b) ReGR factor score 1 for analysis 1  
sum of squares df Mean square f sig.
Between groups 12.541  1 12.541 34.950 0.000
Within groups  6.459 18  0.359
Total 19.000 19
Source: Authors’ findings.
The variance analysis with FAC 1.2 as dependent variable and countrytype indi-
cates again that the means are different for each group, so the sovereign risk is 
different for each group. That is to say, the results are similar to those of ANOVA 
1 (see table 8).
9 At this stage we distinguish between old and new EU member states. The old member states take value 1 
and the new member states, value 0. 
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317Table 9 
One way ANOVA II, with the variable shadow economy (GDP)
a) ReGR factor score 1 for analysis 2  
n Mean std. 
deviation
std. 
error
95% confidence 
interval for mean
Min. Max.
lower 
bound
Upper 
bound
New member 
states 10 -0.8330 0.4204 0.1330 -1.1337 -0.5322 -1.3497 0.0201
Old member 
states 10 0.8330 0.6265 0.1981 0.3848 1.2811 -0.4433 1.7548
Total 20 0.0000 1.0000 0.2236 -0.4680 0.4680 -1.3497 1.7548
b) ReGR factor score 1 for analysis 2  
sum of squares df Mean square f sig.
Between groups 13.877  1 13.877 48.754 0.000
Within groups  5.123 18  0.285
Total 19.000 19
Source: Authors’ findings.
The comparison between the groups confirms our hypothesis. According to the 
results obtained in the first part of the analysis and using traditional variables, the 
mean value for the first group, new member states, was negative, which explains 
their lower credit rating (-0.792). However, the result was positive (0.792) for the 
group of old member states, which explains their low sovereign risk.
When the shadow economy as a percentage of GDP is considered, the results 
change. The means in this case are different from the previous means. There is a 
negative increase for the new member states, which suggests that their sovereign 
risk has been increased (-0.833), while in the group of the old member states, the 
result improves (0.833), which allows us to accept that  their sovereign  risk has 
been reduced. 
As a previous step to the above justification, a linear association between FAC 1.1 
and FAC 1.2 is made and a Pearson correlation coefficient is calculated. Follow-
ing that is Spearsman’s rho, which measures the association between FAC 1.1 and 
FAC 1.2 at ordinal level. We obtain that one explains the other with almost 99% 
of variance.  
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318 Table 10 
Correlations 
a) 
ReGR factor score
1 for analysis 1 1 for analysis 2
REGR factor score 
1 for analysis 1
Pearson’s Correlation 1 0.992**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 20 20
REGR factor score 
1 for analysis 2
Pearson’s Correlation 0.992** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 20 20
Note: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
b) 
ReGR factor score
1 for analysis 1 1 for analysis 2
Spearman’s 
rho
REGR factor 
score 1 for 
analysis 1
Correlation 
coefficient
1.000 0.985**
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 20 20
REGR factor 
score 1 for 
analysis 2
Correlation 
coefficient
0.985** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) 0.000
N 20 20
Note: Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Source: Authors’ findings.
5 conclUsIons
Investment decisions are becoming more and more complex, thus, in these cir-
cumstances, the availability of reliable information is essential. Although the role 
of credit rating agencies is to guide investors’ decisions, credit ratings have not 
been sufficiently reliable indicators in the past years.
The literature documents a strong link between the shadow economy and a coun-
try’s main economic variables. However, credit rating agencies have failed to take 
this relationship into account when assessing sovereign risk. The purpose of this 
paper was to analyze whether including the shadow economy into the estimation 
of the sovereign risk index of some selected old and new EU member states im-
proves it or not. The results showed that the new EU members, that is, a country 
that is characterized by a relatively larger shadow economy and a lower GDP per 
capita than the old members, would acquire a worse credit rating. Conversely, the 
old EU member states would see their credit ratings improved.
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319annex 1
S&P credit ratings (2012) 
country Rating outlook
Denmark AAA Stable
Sweden AAA Stable
United Kingdom AAA Stable
Germany AAA Stable
Finland AAA Stable
Netherlands AAA Stable
Austria AA+ Negative
France AA Stable
Belgium AA Negative
Ireland A Stable
Estonia AA- Stable
Slovak Republic A Positive
Slovenia A- Stable
Bulgaria BB+ Stable
Latvia A- Stable
Lithuania A- Stable
Croatia BB+ Stable
Romania BBB- Stable
Hungary BB Stable
Poland A- Positive
Source: S&P Statistics.
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320 annex 2
Shadow economy in selected European countries (2012) (%)
country share of shadow economy
Denmark 13.4
Sweden 14.3
United Kingdom 10.1
Germany 13.3
Finland 13.3
Netherlands   9.5
Austria   7.6
France 10.8
Belgium 16.8
Ireland 12.7
Estonia 28.2
Slovak Republic 15.5
Slovenia 23.6
Bulgaria 31.9
Latvia 26.1
Lithuania 28.5
Croatia 29.0
Romania 29.1
Hungary 22.5
Poland 24.4
Source: Schneider (2013).
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